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This discussion is on the theme of what lies in store for Winnipeg 
after the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative. In order to address that subject 
adequately, it is necessary to have some understanding of the situation 
which existed before the Core Area Initiative. That, of course, opens 
a limitless historical vista, and we could consume much more than the 
entire day in looking at the "Before" situation in preparation for the 
discussion of the "After." Nevertheless, I find it necessary to review 
some of the background, and to touch briefly on two matters which I think 
are important for a proper understanding of the subject. 
The first matter to draw to your attention is how severely limited 
are the powers of a municipal government. The municipality's competence, 
that is, its statutory, legal, and financial powers to act on issues of 
an economic or social nature, such as for example, industrial development, 
job creation, unemployment relief, social welfare, health care, education, 
etc. or even on matters of an environmental nature, are extremely limited. 
Such matters lie within the sphere of competence of the provinces or the 
federal government. Municipal government is concerned primarily with 
land and the servicing of land. A common expression of this arrangement 
of areas of competence is that municipal government is concerned with 
services to property, while the provincial and federal government are 
concerned with services to people. 
The second matter arises out of the first. Because statutory and 
fiscal restraints confine the competence of municipal government to 
issues affecting the use and servicing of land it must follow that the 
interest of municipal councils must be focussed on land-related issues. 
This is just another way of saying that the dominant interest of municipal 
councils must be development. It cannot be otherwise, given the very 
nature of municipal government, the constitutional context within which 
it is created, the statutory context within which it functions, and 
the fiscal structure within which it is financed. 
There is an extensive literature of criticism of municipal government, 
attaching its eagerness for development and its alledgedly too-ready 
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accomodation of the developer. Whatever may be the ideological merits or 
defects of this criticism, the fact is that city councils have no option 
but to be not merely concerned with development as the normal condition 
of their vocation, but to encourage it. Without it, their role is simply 
to repair roads and pick up garbage and even that role is in jeopardy 
without continual augmenting of the municipal revenues, most of which 
comes from new development. Development is the life-blood of the city. 
It is the source of urban vitality, and the principle stimulus to which 
the members of the city council can respond. 
During the decades following World War Two, that life-blood was 
flowing rich and fast in the veins of our Canadian Cities. The facts 
about the urban explosion in Canada after the war are common knowledge. 
The processing of new land to accomodate the dynamic growth of the urban 
population, and the extension of the built-up area was the most central 
and characteristic activity of our metropolitan centres and their govern-
ments during those post-war decades. In Winnipeg, it is also common 
knowledge that during this period, in spite of the high level of urban 
activity throughout the land, and even in this city for perhaps a decade 
and a half, the downtown declined in terms of a variety of criteria. 
Retailing fell off, vacancy rates rose, new investment was infrequent, 
industry moved out, few new residences were constructed, demolition was 
significant, serious and petty crimes increased. There is a long litany 
of woes which are commonly cited as afflicting Winnipeg's downtown. 
There is also a plethora of reasons explaining this phenomenon. 
Most of the reasons which are offered are valid, but they are also 
for the most part secondary or contingent reasons. The basic reason for 
the condition of Winnipeg's core area, as indeed for most of the problems 
which beset the city, is that Winnipeg has arrived at a condition of no 
growth, and has been in that condition for a considerable period of time. 
At a time when most of the other metropolitan centres in Canada were 
growing at an unprecedented rate, Winnipeg was slowing down and crawling 
to a stand-still. For the thirty years between 1951 and 1981, the growth 
of the major metropolitan centres of western Canada - of the whole of 
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Canada for that matter - was quite remarkable. For example, Regina grew 
by over 130%; Saskatoon by 190%; Edmonton by 280%; Calgary by 333%; 
Vancouver by 140%. Greater Winnipeg grew by 65%. This city's most 
impressive rate of growth was achieved between 1951 and 1961 when it 
averaged 3.4% per year. In the following decade, 1961-1971, it averaged 
1.35% per year. And in the decade 1971-1981 Winnipeg's growth rate 
averaged about .8% per year, and only .5% for the last half of that decade. 
Although every aspect of the city's life felt the impact of this 
situation in its own terms, there was a general failure on the part of 
the public as well as of the city government to recognize the full 
measure of its implications. The central concern of the city's govern-
ment remained the processing of land for development, but with the 
stabilization of the population growth, demand for new land for develop-
ment also subsided. In other large metropolitan centres such as Toronto, 
Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver, land development continued apace until 
into the 1980s. Even Saskatoon and Regina, traditionally the slow-
growth centres of the west, seemed dynamic by comparison with Winnipeg. 
The prevailing view throughout this long period of decline has been that 
Winnipeg never experiences great highs or lows, but moves along on a 
fairly even keel, along the path of the national average; when the 
national economy is down, Winnipeg is down, and when the national economy 
improves, Winnipeg's economy improves. These fluctuations responding to 
those in the national economy, are viewed as the normal cyclical pattern 
of this city. 
This is a superficial view. Winnipeg does not recover commensurately 
with the national recovery. Although Winnipeg's economic fortunes may 
indeed fluctuate in consonance with those of the nation, the level to 
which it recovers after each dip is a declining level. Certainly the 
demographic curve over the last thirty years does not provide any basis 
for great optimism or smugness. What is not generally appreciated is 
that the condition of population equilibrium in which Winnipeg finds itself 
is not a cyclical or temporary condition but one into which the city has 
been moving for many decades and which now is probably a permanent condition. 
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If one were to try to fix a date or identify a milestone, marking 
the descent of Winnipeg from its position as the major metropolis between 
Toronto and Vancouver, and its settling onto a plateau of slow growth 
and secondary status, one would probably have to recognize two epochal 
events. One is the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 which marked 
the beginning of the end of Winnipeg's role and importance as the trans-
portation, bulk-breaking, warehousing, wholesaling, and distribution 
centre of western Canada. The other is the discovery of the Leduc oil-
field, on Edmonton's southerly doorstep, in 1947, which ensured the shift 
of development energy and investment capital to Calgary and Edmonton. 
Winnipeg's importance has declined steadily since these events, and the 
importance of Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmonton has steadily increased. 
All three now surpass Winnipeg in status, and as centres in which important 
economic and other urban metropolitan functions and activities are located, 
both regionally and nationally. Even Regina and Saskatoon have enjoyed 
a greater relative enhancement of their respective roles and status than 
has Winnipeg. 
In times of vigorous urban growth, city governments can focus their 
interest on land-related issues, which is their essential responsibility, 
and pay little heed to the other social and economic problems which 
properly lie beyond their sphere of competence. If these problems persist 
and no effective solutions are foand,. the city government can berate the 
seniol" governments for their failure, and continue to concern itself with 
those development-generated issues which lie within its proper area of 
jurisdiction. Moreover this other order of urban problems is generally 
quiescent during periods of vigorous growth. Such periods are periods of 
prosperity, high levels of employment, and low incidence of social distress. 
In an era of slow growth, however, the decline in the processes of 
development reduces the development-generated demands on the city council 
and the civic administration. In this circumstance, the city government 
finds itself in a rather anomalous position because the economic and social 
problems with which they cannot deal, but which could be overlain by 
development issues in times of vigorous growth, cannot so readily be 
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submerged from council's view. More than that, because these latter issues 
belong to the fields of jurisdiction of the senior governments, and because 
there is not the counterbalancing development activity to give the council 
high visibility, the presence of the provincial and federal governments 
looms larger on the civic scene than would otherwise be the case. 
The senior governments' presence is already large-scale in the field 
of economic and social programs in the city during periods of recession or 
slow growth, and almost inevitably it can be expected that these programs 
will be coupled with proposals for stimulating development and attracting 
private sector investment to get growth and development going again. 
This, in fact, is what has happened in Winnipeg, where the Core Area 
Initiative is perhaps the most clear-cut textbook demonstration of this 
process. We have arrived at the position in which the major planning and 
development decisions affecting the City of Winnipeg are not being made by 
city council and do not involve in any formal way the city's planning 
department. The federal and provincial governments from the beginning 
have been the "heavies" in the Initiative, and the city has been treated 
as a truculent minor player whose presence has to be tolerated because the 
game is being played in the city's back yard. 
Public attention has now switched from the Core Area Initiative to 
the North Portage Development Corporation. In part the switch may be due 
to the much higher profile that a large-scale physical development project 
commands as compared with the small-scale, low-profile activities of the 
Initiative office. In part, however, it is because intuitively the public 
has come to the conclusion that the Initiative office has failed to accom-
plish anything which will revitalize the core, and that the last opportunity 
for achieving that objective must lie with the North Portage project. 
The Initiative will fail to revitalize the core. Neither will the 
North Portage project revitalize the core. Certainly it will markedly 
change the character and activities in the three or four blocks which are 
redeveloped. But the effect of the change will not be felt for any great 
·--------------. -- --··-- .. 
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distance beyond the boundaries of the project. The area of downtown 
deterioration is too extensive, and its nature too complex, and the re-
development proposed is too small in scale and too simple in its struc-
ture for it to be able to generate a strong surge of new vitality through-
out the entire downtown. I do not believe that the deteriorated condition 
of the core area is a localized phenomenon, peculiar to that part of the 
city, and that it is therefore amenable to revitalization by merely 
pressing new public monies into that location. The condition of the 
core area is symptomatic of a much more deep-seated and endemic malaise 
from which the city as a whole is suffering. That malaise is the condition 
of no growth. 
Until the appropriate measures are taken to deal effectively with this 
condition, there is little of significance that programs like the Core 
Area Initiative or the North Portage project can accomplish. The expec-
tation of revitalization raised by these programs is a misguided expectation. 
These programs do not recognize, and are not based upon the fundamental 
social and economic reality of Winnipeg's situation. They are directed 
towards the symptoms rather than the cause of the city's malaise, and 
we should be probing far below those surface manifestations to find a 
fuller understanding of what is happening, and a more appropriate strategy 
for adjusting to that condition. 
What is necessary in order to revitalize the city's core is nothing 
less than a strategy for revitalizing the city. One of the first steps 
necessary is to recognize that the normal forces at work in a growth economy 
are not operative here in Winnipeg. We cannot look to development to 
provide the source of urban vitality which other cities enjoy, and which 
even we enjoyed in another time. That is why we cannot look to cities 
such as Toronto or Dallas or even Milwaukee as a model. The notion that 
we can revitalize Winnipeg's downtown by building a large amount of new 
retail floor space on Portage Avenue is based on the mistaken view that 
these growth economy models are relevant in Winnipeg's no-growth situation. 
It may be that such new retail floor space will be successful. But it will 
succeed only at the cost of considerable damage to other retailers now 
serving the Winnipeg retail market. And it will not revitalize the 
downtown. 
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At one time, retailing was the major function of downtown Winnipeg. 
/' 
Entertainment and services were also important downtown functions. 
However, the structure of the city and its downtown have now changed, and 
these former downtown functions have now in very large measure been 
decentralized to the suburbs. Even when they were still the major activ-
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ities in the central business district, however, the downtown was not 
a vital place because of their presence. Certainly the business activities 
in the area enjoyed a higher level of vitality than they do today. But 
business is largely a nine-to-five activity. Outside of those hours the 
central business district was not a very lively place; and even within 
those hours, the types of activities were very specialized and limited. 
The notion of a lively central business district whose vitality comprises 
a high level of retailing and business activity, merely reflects the 
businessman's traditional view of the nature and role of the central 
business district. Indeed the very phrase "central business district" 
sums up this traditional view of the nature of the heart of the city. 
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The businessman is not concerned with activities other than business, and 
does not see the central area as serving any other significant function. 
What happens in the downtown after business hours is of no great concern 
to him. That is still the view of our downtown businessmen, and indeed 
of many urban economists and other urban professionals and consultants. 
Such a view is understandable where there is indeed a high level 
of business activity in the downtown, continually fed and expanded and 
enhanced by a high growth rate. In those circumstances it doesn't matter 
that the downtown is dead outside of business hours, or that its activities 
are of a very specialized and limited type within business hours. As 
long as business is good, everybody is happy, and the downtown is regarded 
as "vital." 
But when a city is in a state of stagnation, and a large part of its 
traditional central area functions have been decentralized to the suburbs, 
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the downtown cannot continue to function as the commercial centre of the 
metropolis, if only because there is not enough urban vitaltty §enerated 
by new development to continue to nourish and sustain the central business 
district in its traditional form and location. Nor can an infusion - even 
a massive infusion - of new retail or other commercial floor space reverse 
the condition because it would require continuing new growth and develop-
ment to effect and sustain a long-term reversal of the stagnant condition. 
Core area vitality in Winnipeg must have a different meaning from 
the conventional meaning of an active business sector. The revitalization 
of Winnipeg•s core area cannot be achieved through the vain attempt to go 
backward in time and to recreate a core which can function as the retail 
and commercial centre of the metropolis. That era and that function are 
now irrevocably behind us. What we are faced with now is the need to 
create a new kind of core area. The fundamental building block of this 
new kind of core area is the residential community: not just one such 
residential community, but many; not just in one location, but in many; 
not just of one kind, but of many kinds, each with its own character and 
identity. It is only when we have a mtnimum of, say, 25,000 new resi.dents 
living in the area between the C.P.R. tracks, the Assinibo1ne River, the 
Red River, and Memorial Boulevard, that Winnipeg will have a truly vital 
core area. 
It may not be possible to achieve such a goal. Certainly the City of 
Winnipeg through its own efforts couldn•t achieve it. Nor could it be 
achieved at the current rate of growth. Clearly then, at least two conditions 
must be met as a basis upon which to build toward that goal of revital-
ization. One is a new kind of partnership between the city and the other 
governments, as well as between the public sector generally and the 
private sector. The other is a concerted effort to introduce new activities 
into Winnipeg•s economy which will provide some growth energy. 
As indicated earlier, we can assume the continued, perhaps even 
growing presence of the senior governments in our civic affairs. What the 
precise nature of their future involvement might be is unforeseeable, but 
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one can be reasonably sure that they will be involved. It may be that 
the Core Area Initiative agreement will be renewed and extended. That 
would be a mistake. A new instrumentality must be created which will be 
able to address more effectively the basic problems indicated. The 
present Initiative does not recognize this need, and does not address 
the basic fact of no growth in Winnipeg, and has not systematically 
attempted to deal with this fundamental economic issue. Unless some way 
can be found to stimulate new economic growth in the City of Winnipeg, 
efforts at core area revitalization are not likely to succeed. 
As a step in this direction, the City of Winnipeg should have the 
statutory and financial capacity to pursue more freely than is now 
possible, a broader range and a more highly selective choice of industrial 
development strategies and programs. The city needs greater entrepren-
eurial powers and a broader revenue base so that it can provide the 
climate and incentives for new economic growth. The Winnipeg Industrial 
Development Corporation is doing the best job it can in present circum-
stances. But it does not have the appropriate mandate or sufficient 
funding to allow it to pursue a proper economic development strategy. 
It will of course be pointed out that there are several departments 
of the provincial government which have responsibilities in this field. 
I am not minimizing their role. r~y concern is that their constituency 
is the entire Province of ~~anitoba, and l~innipeg is not a priority in 
their programs. What is needed, perhaps in addition to or in conjunction 
with the present provincial programs, is an enhanced and augmented city 
program. 
It has now become a cliche - almost an automatic knee-jerk reaction -
whenever the question of new economic development potential is raised, to 
say 11 high technology. 11 Nevertheless I still believe that that is the 
direction in which new economic development strategies must be pursued. 
There are several fields in which Winnipeg has the potential for develop-
ing and exploiting new technologies and processes which could provide the 
basis for some new economic growth, even if only on a modest scale. 
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·But the city can•t realize this potential on its own; and the Province 
may find it inappropriate to concentrate a specific economic development 
program on Winnipeg. It is altogether likely that the federal govern-
ment would have to participate. Which brings us again to a tripartite 
government program. I suggest however that $96 million dollars spent 
on a carefully thought out economic development program in a selected 
field or fields of high technology would yield greater dividends in 
core area revitalization than the present Core Area Initiative. We 
are going to have continuing involvement in civic affairs on the part of 
the two senior governments as long as Hinnipeg is in a condition of no 
growth. This means more tripartite agreements. Let•s make sure that 
the next expensive one tries to deal with the basic cause of our declining 
vitality, instead of merely dabbling with the symptoms. 
As a final point, I want to touch on the need for a new relationship 
between the public sector and the private sector. It is important to 
recognize that in society there can be very little economic vitality 
without the private sector. If private investment and entrepreneurship 
are not available there will be few new jobs created and little new 
wealth produced. This is true in the larger general field of industrial 
development as well as in the more specific field of urban land develop-
ment. One of the defects of the Core Area Initiative so far has been 
its failure to involve the private sector. And one of the dangers of 
the North Portage project so far is that it has not recognized the need, 
and indeed the opportunity for a new creative relationship with the 
private investment and development community. The Development Corporation 
is proceeding along the lines of the traditional roles of the public and 
private sectors. 
But the traditional roles and stances are ineffectual in a no-growth 
situation. Traditionally, the public sector and the private sector--the 
city and the developer--operate in a relationship in which the developer 
proposes and the city responds, and it is the developer who initiates 
the process. In a dynamic city, private sector investment is assured, 
and there is rarely any need for special arrangements between the public 
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sector and the private sector to attract such investment. For example, in 
Toronto, or in Calgary when it was booming, there would not have been any 
need for a publicly funded Core Area Initiative. Private capital was 
readily available for an Eaton Centre or a Husky Tower. 
However, in a situation of slow growth there is little development 
initiated by the private developer. The development initiative must there-
fore swing to the public sector, because jobs, revenues, business and other 
basic economic matters and political interests are at stake. The public 
sector, however, cannot for economic and political reasons carry this devel-
opment initiative entirely by itself. It must seek to involve the private 
sector. That effort normally finds expression in the offering of financial 
incentives by the public sector to the private sector in the form of write-
down in the cost of land, tax concessions, reduced-interest loans, publicly 
financed parking, and so forth. 
Nevertheless, the basic traditional positions occupied by the public 
sector and the private sector respectively are essentially positions of 
confrontation, or adversary positions, in which, at the extremes, the city 
officials are seen as protecting the interests of the public against the 
predations of the rapacious developer, or from the other side, in which the 
enterprising and far sighted plans of the developer are obstructed and 
frustrated by a rigid and unimaginative bureaucracy and by self-serving 
politicians. 
Such attitudes and roles can only be countenanced in circumstances 
where growth and development activity is at a high level, investment oppor-
tunity and alternatives are plentiful, and financing for development is 
readily available. In these circumstances the traditional confrontational, 
adversary, positions of the city and the developer can be tolerated as part 
of the game in which each side tries to gain the maximum advantage for its 
own interests. 
However, where there is little development activity, these traditional 
attitudes and roles produce no advantage for anyone. The private devel-
oper simply moves his capital and his expertise to locations where 
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opportunity is more plentiful, and climate less hostile; and the slow-
growth city suffers the consequences. \l!i nni peg provides a clear demon-
stration of this situation. Local investment capital and development 
expertise have been transferred to other locations, notably the sun-belt 
of the United States; the city council's capacity to function effectively 
is diminished while the role and presence of the provincial and 
federal governments is enlarged; and the status and vitality of the city, 
both in the regional and national context, and indeed in terms of its 
attractiveness as a place to live, decline. 
The establishment of the North Portage Development Corporation may 
indicate the possibility of re-ordering the relationship between the 
city and the private sector. The present form and function of the 
Corporation is still a long way from what is required, but it may be 
a step in the right direction, and may therefore offer some grounds for 
optimism. What is required is a much more direct and much closer relation-
ship between the public sector and the private sector in the planning, 
financing and carrying out of selected critical development projects. 
The appropriate instrument might be a permanent, joint public-private 
development corporation, at arms length from government, whose role would 
be not only to plan and carry out, but also to provide a flow of invest-
ment capital on a joint equity basis, for the development of selected key 
projects which the private sector alone would not be interested in 
undertaking in a slow-growth situation. Perhaps the North Portage Develop-
ment Corporation is a foreshadowing of the ultimate appropriate instrument. 
At present it is a "one-shot" deal; its life span is limited; its relation-
ship with the private sector is simply the traditional relationship; its 
linkage to government is only marginally different from the traditional 
linkage; its organizational structure is rudimentary. There is much that 
needs doing to transform it, or its successor, into the right kind of 
instrument to stimulate the right kind of development in this slow-growth 
city. 
Whatever may be the appropriate solution, it is clear that no such 
solution is at present being actively discussed. Indeed it is my conviction 
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that although Winnipeg's condition of slow growth is statistically recog-
nized, the implications behind those statistics are not recognized, and 
there is not even the recognition that the traditional institutional 
arrangements and practices are quite inappropriate in a no-growth situation. 
It seems to me that unless such new relationships are established, Winnipeg's 
future, after the Core Area Initiative, will be very much like Winnipeg's 
past, before the Core Area Initiative - one of continuing near-stagnation; 
continuing sporadic but unsuccessful attempts to deal with local crises; 
continuing ebbing of our city's vitality; and greater and greater intrusion 
of the provincial and federal governments into our city's affairs, on the 
basis of ad hoc improvisations and political expediencies which are costly 
but which in the long term will provide no effective revitalization of 
our city in general or our downtown in particular. 
